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24.1.    Introduction 
Most archaeologists know the importance of a proper study 
of similarity relationships among archaeological artefacts. 
However, there has been some controversy describing the 
kind of inference derived fi^om the detection of those statis- 
tical relationships. That controversy does not come from 
the nature of similarity, but from its way of calculation. 
Most archaeologists coincide in definitions like: 
"SIMILITUDE (or similarity): Formal resemblance 
in general details, but not in everything". 
However, what does it mean resemblance in general de- 
tails! Some researchers have proposed that this property 
can be measured selecting a reduced set of descriptive fea- 
tures. Those features are selected because of ûi&n relevance 
in an explicit task. In this context, relevant feature is used 
as a synonym of intrinsic property. Adams (1988) defines 
the term "intrinsic property" as a property of an object that 
is inherent to the object itself, and is independent of the 
properties of other objects or the deposit with which the 
object is associated. 
The opposite approach rejects any selection of descrip- 
tive features based on their contextual or intrinsic relevance. 
It adopts instead a more "universal" method based on the 
quantitative evaluation of the number of common features. 
In this context, similarity is a mathematical function meas- 
uring the number of commonalties among a series of ar- 
chaeological artefacts. 
The Spaulding-Hodson debate (see Whallon and Brown 
1982) exemplifies this controversy. Are types really a prod- 
uct of the grouping of objects or are a result of the variables 
(or attributes) association? Hodson asserted that seeking 
associations between attributes is quite different from ob- 
ject clustering, and that an archaeological concept has to 
be defined in terms of the objects explained by that concept 
(Hodson 1980). Spaulding argued, on the other hand, that 
there is no reason to work with "sets of objects"; the pattern 
of associations among the variables is a more pragmatic 
and easy way to understand archaeological types, specially 
if variables are defined in a nominal scale. 
Cowgill (1990) and Read (1989) try to answer to this 
dilemma arguing that both positions are only two different 
levels of analysis. Cowgill thinks that the debate has been 
misguided because some researchers have been talking about 
searching for patterning within a single assemblage or 
among a group of very closely related assemblages while 
others have intended comparisons between or across a 
number of different assemblages.  That is, archaeologists 
do not recognise whether types (or archaeological concepts) 
are discovered or imposed because there is not any coher- 
ent discussion about the level of analysis. The possibility 
of making worthwhile inferences about categories mean- 
ingful to the ancient makers and users depends on the mak- 
ing clear whether one is talking about classes generated by 
considering objects from a single assemblage (or at most a 
group of very closely related assemblages) or classes gener- 
ated by considering objects from diverse assemblages. "I 
suspect that most archaeologists are so deeply committed 
to using classification for between-assemblage studies that 
they cannot assimilate the idea of classifications dedicated 
to the search for patterning within a single assemblage" 
(Cowgill 1990: 67). 
Read (1989) asserts that morphological similarity is 
the consequence of clustering, and not its cause. It is a 
good inference mechanism to measure the pattern of asso- 
ciations within an assemblage, but the archaeologist has to 
build that assemblage before he/she computes similarity 
algorithms. "If structuring processes are the beginning point 
of understanding the data in hand, then the initial goal be- 
comes one of relating structuring process to measurable 
groups in the data and not the reverse" (Read 1989, 184). 
In this paper I will try to show how this debate has 
been affected by the statistical methods used by archaeolo- 
gists. Neural networks and connective algorithms allow 
archaeologists to discover the importance of object group- 
ings by accepting also the relevance of the pattern of asso- 
ciations among the variables: groups of artefacts are not 
really useful for an archaeologist if they are not expressed 
in a specific formal language. Thus, the goal of pattern of 
associations is to represent some archaeological concept. 
We can use a neural network to translate a group of objects 
into a pattern of associations. 
24.2.    Concepts or types? 
Why should we discover, describe and explain "similar- 
ity"? I think that by analysing similarity relationships we 
not only build groups, but we define concepts or theoreti- 
cal entities as well. The detection of similarity is a method 
to build archaeological concepts; probably it is not the only 
inference method we have to carry on this task, but one of 
the most important tools in archaeological practice. 
What is a concept! Psychologists say that concepts re- 
flect the way that we divide the world into classes, and much 
of what we learn, communicate, and reason about involves 
relations among these classes (Sternberg and Smith 1988). 
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Concepts are our means of linking perceptual and non-per- 
ceptual information. For example, we use a perceptual de- 
scription of the grave goods in a burial and then use our 
non-perceptual beliefs about the social nature of material 
culture to direct our interpretation: "a grave with a sword 
among the grave goods belongs to a high social category". 
Concepts are recognition devices because they serve as en- 
try points into our knowledge stores and provide us with 
expectations that we can use to guide our actions. By par- 
titioning the archaeological record into classes using 
explanatory concepts, we decrease the amount of informa- 
tion we must perceive, learn, remember, communicate and 
reason about. 
It is important that we see archaeological types as con- 
cepts and not as pure sets of related artefacts or related 
variables. They are the theoretical entities we need to or- 
ganise archaeological knowledge into archaeological theo- 
ries. In this paper I do not deal with the classical debate 
about the nature of theoretical entities (see Tuomela 1973, 
Niiniluoto and Tuomela 1973, Rivadulla 1986, Hooker 
1987, Churchland 1988, Thagard 1988, Gooding 1990), 
although it has a great importance to identify concept for- 
mation mechanisms. In essence, the controversy about the 
real nature of concepts comes from the fact that they are 
mental representations, and not empirical categories. This 
fact is also true about archaeological types, that is, they are 
virtual entities without existence out of the archaeological 
theory they contribute to organise. Consequently archaeo- 
logical concepts are unobservable. We have access to them 
only in terms of their instances. 
To have a concept of X is to know something about the 
properties of X 's instances. Most archaeologists seem to 
think that the properties contained in a concept are singly 
necessary and jointly sufficient to define that concept 
(Adams 1988). For a property to be singly necessary, every 
instance of the concept must have that property; for a set of 
properties to be jointly sufficient, every entity having that 
set must be an instance of the concept. Such properties are 
referred to as defining or intrinsic for collectively they con- 
stitute a definition (Shoemaker 1980). According to this 
position, an archaeological artefact will be categorised as 
an instance of a concept if and only if it contains the defin- 
ing properties of the concept. 
The greatest shortcoming of the aforementioned posi- 
tion is the "practical" failure in discovering true defini- 
tions of concepts. Archaeologists are incapable of specifying 
the defining (or "intrinsic" in Adams' sense) properties of 
even the most simple concept. Different archaeologists use 
different definitions for the same concept. Even worse, they 
are not able to realise that they work with different entities. 
The reader may think that this is only a consequence of the 
failure of positivism, but the consequence is the same: there 
is not any single way to distinguish between intrinsic prop- 
erties and descriptive features. Of course, we can use "sub- 
jective" evaluations about what is intrinsic or relevant and 
what is pure descriptive however, I believe that we cannot 
find any profitable solution in this way. 
The non perceptual nature of concepts prevents the 
definition of their intrinsic properties. Is there any way to 
solve this epistemological problem? Psychologists use the 
notion of "prototype" to study the nature of concepts (Rosch 
and Mervis 1975). If there is no mechanism that enables 
us to decide which are the relevant intrinsic properties to 
define a concept, then we have to study the most typical 
instance of the concept to learn something about its nature. 
In other words, the definition properties of a concept are 
assumed to occur only in some instances, which contribute 
to define a prototype, for it describes accurately only the 
"best examples" of a concept. Therefore, the content of a 
concept is its prototype, and an object will be categorised 
as an instance of a concept if it is sufficiently similar to the 
prototype, similarity being determined, in part by the number 
of properties that the object and the prototype share. 
How can archaeologists use the notion of prototype? 
Methods used by psychologists to build concepts from pro- 
totypes are not useful to us. Psychological research is based 
on interviewing volunteers; given a concept, people are 
asked about the degree of typicality of some of its instances; 
the arithmetic mean of all subjective evaluations character- 
ises the concept. One way to build archaeological concepts 
may be this: look for consensus. However, I think that ar- 
chaeologists need more reliable methods; therefore, I pro- 
pose the use of experimentation. 
An experiment is nothing more than a series of con- 
trolled observations. For example, if we want to experi- 
ment with the chronology of a particular pottery shape, we 
must observe a data set {or control set) which includes only 
instances of the concept, e.g. "20th Century". This con- 
trolled observation allows us to transfer the descriptive in- 
formation contained in the instances, into the representation 
of the concept. Induction may be defined as the transfer- 
ence of information from a set of data items (observed in 
the empirical level) to the representation of a concept (Hol- 
land et al. 1986). The "representation of a concept" is a 
physical entity only because we can build it as a computa- 
tional unit able to store the induced knowledge. 
Learning, generalisation or induction (different names 
for the same reasoning mechanism) is a phenomenon ex- 
hibited when a system improves its performance at a given 
task without being reprogrammed (Forsyth 1989); in other 
words, not every transference of knowledge from data to 
concepts is profitable. Only if the experimental induction 
leads us to the improvement of a previous concept, then we 
will accept the new definition. Improvement can mean 
various things, including: a higher proportion of correct 
decisions, faster response, lower-cost solutions and wider 
range of applicability. In all of these cases, induction im- 
plies a comparison with another situation or context; we 
cannot learn anything unless its performance can be as- 
serted reliably. For induction to take place, there must be a 
criterion according to which decisions or partial solutions 
can be scored. Otherwise no one can say whether the sys- 
tem has changed for the better or for the worse. Then, 
evaluative feedback is absolutely fundamental to the ar- 
chaeological concept formation. 
To improve a representation we should define more 
control sets. For example, one with instances of the con- 
cept "21st Century", and the other with instances of the 
concept "19th Century". For pragmatic reasons, the best 
representation of our concept will be the most discrimina- 
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tive one. It is easy to understand that the typical variations 
from typicality observed during experiments or controlled 
situations are our source information to build prototypes; 
an instance is typical to the extent that its properties occur 
frequently in the concept. 
There is nothing really new in this "experimental" ap- 
proach to prototyping. In archaeology, Cowgill (1990) has 
asserted that the analysis of patterning within a single as- 
semblage must precede the analysis of patterning among a 
series of empirically unrelated assemblages. We have only 
to insist in the controlled nature of the assemblage: not all 
data sets are appropriate for prototyping, because we need 
to know before that all items in the assemblage are instances 
of a specific concept. Psychologists call this inference op- 
eration supervised learning (Fisher and Pazzani 1991). In 
early psychological studies, subjects were assumed to have 
discovered the appropriate concept after correctly predict- 
ing class membership for a sufficient number of consecu- 
tive trials. These studies assumed that the experimenter 
classified possible instances as "positive" or "negative", 
according to what he/she previously knew about the con- 
cept. 
Concepts are used to explain empirical data. If and 
only if there is a relationship between the empirical data 
and the concept, the archaeologist will explain the archaeo- 
logical record. Therefore, "using a concept" is equivalent 
to defining the relationship between a concept and its in- 
stance (Thagard 1989, Barcelo 1993a). However, we have 
built the representation of the concept according to what 
we know about some of its instances. It is not exactly true 
that an archaeological artefact is an instance of a member 
if it is sufficiently similar to known concept instances. The 
controlled observation or experiment needed to define a 
prototype does not operate on the basis of content-free gen- 
eral inference rules but, rather, is often tied to particular 
bodies of knowledge and is greatly influenced by the con- 
text in which it occurs. 
Concepts are taken to be mini-theories about the na- 
ture of the categories they describe because we have inte- 
grated the experiment, the context of use, and the prototype 
into a single entity to be able to define that concept. Con- 
ceptualising an archaeological artefact is then a matter of 
applying the relevant theory, and consequently the defini- 
tion of the concept depends on its explanatory power. The 
way we use concepts affects the way we can represent them. 
The proposal that a concept includes only a prototype, 
turns out to be too simple because it is hard to see how a 
prototype can integrate all the knowledge needed in con- 
cept formation. Using prototypes to define concepts can be 
misguiding because of the potential variability among the 
instances: the concept definition varies each time we com- 
pute an instance, because we are introducing more vari- 
ability into the concept representation. Psychologists think 
that concepts contain at least two components: a prototype 
and a core (Michalski 1989). The cores of fuzzy concepts 
are not definitions in the usual sense, but meta-knowledge 
units. In other words, we are speaking about knowledge on 
the way to induce the concept (Pitrat 1989). The inevitable 
result of this fact is that any representation of a concept can 
be never complete, because it is related with a fixed context 
of use. There are always many possible ways to use a con- 
cept in a theory. 
Concept representations are intrinsically unstable, be- 
cause they depend on the meta-knowledge available in each 
time. Cores do not need to be fixed, because scientists may 
change their theories and the way they plan to use con- 
cepts. However, not only concept representations vary across 
the different contexts of use, the properties and the pattern 
of associations among all instances also vary (Barsalou 
1989). Instability both between and within individuals for 
graded structure may reflect uncertainty about the status of 
atypical instances. Because archaeologists lack knowledge 
for these exemplars or are unsure about their category mem- 
bership, they may frequently change their minds about these 
exemplars' typicality and thereby produce instability. Ac- 
cording to this view, stability should increase monotonically 
with typicality. 
As we have seen, prototype properties tend to be per- 
ceptually salient, although not perfectly diagnostic of con- 
cept membership; in contrast, the properties that comprise 
the core are most diagnostic of concept membership but 
tend to be relatively hidden. Because the core properties 
are not easily accessible, we have to use heuristic rules to 
decide the experimental context in which we will calculate 
prototypicality. We confront some representation of an in- 
stance with our knowledge of the various categories it might 
belong to. The instance in one of these categories will pro- 
duce a reasonable explanation of the information we have 
about it, if and only if this explanation is better than the 
one produced by other candidate categories. Only in those 
circumstances we will infer that an instance is a member of 
a category (Murphy and Medin 1985, Wattenmaker et al. 
1988, Rips 1989). 
24.3.    Advances in the mathematical 
study of similarity relationships 
One of the main strategies to define archaeological con- 
cepts has been to sort a specific collection of objects into 
groups, which members (in terms of properties salient to 
the analyst) tend to be much like one another and consider- 
ably unlike objects assigned to other groups, and then try- 
ing to see what distinguishes the groups from one another. 
Cowgill (1990) has characterised this approach by the 
phrase: "internal cohesion and external isolation". 
We have many different mathematical techniques that 
are powerful for separating and/or aggregating data viewed 
as points in some n dimensional space. But are the premises 
of these techniques the premises under which culturally 
based distinctions were made? Classical approaches to simi- 
larity relationships are based on the assumption that per- 
ceived dissimilarity is associated with conceptual distance 
(or typicality). This approach represents the observations 
as points in a multidimensional metric space, and assumes 
that judgments of the perceived similarity of two stimuli 
are inversely related to the distance between their percep- 
tual representations (Shepard 1987, Sokal 1988). This class 
of models, known as the geometric model of similarity, is 
contained within the larger class of multidimensional scal- 
ing (MDS) models.  MDS models do not necessarily re- 
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quire the perceptual space to be metric. If we focus on the 
simplest case (two-dimensional space and Euclidean met- 
ric), the MDS model assumes that: 
d (a, b) = [(Xa - x^p + (y, - yi,)']'^ 
where d(a,b) is the calculated dissimilarity , xa is the co- 
ordinate of observation a on dimension x of the conceptual 
space. 
Because of their reliance on distance, geometric mod- 
els predict that perceived dissimilarities must satisfy cer- 
tain distance axioms: 
• the self-dissimilarities of all observations are equal. 
There are some problems with this axiom: distinc- 
tive or unique archaeological artefacts, or objects 
having few features in common with other objects 
have a greater perceived self-similarity, and so a 
smaller perceived self-dissimilarity (see Krumhansl 
1978). 
• Minimality. Two different artefacts are always at 
least as dissimilar as either artefact is to itself. 
• Symmetry. The asymmetry underlying most arte- 
fact matching shows that this axiom is also inap- 
propriate in archaeological research (see Tversky 
1977, Glucksberg and Keysar 1990, on the asymme- 
try of similarity relationships). 
• Triangle inequality (or Ultrametric Axiom). A cen- 
tury ago, William James (1890) gave an example of 
what seem a clear violation: a flame is similar to the 
moon because they both appear luminous, and the 
moon is similar to a ball because they are both round. 
In contradiction to the triangle inequality, a flame 
and a ball are very dissimilar. This kind of viola- 
tion is very usual in ethno-archaeological research 
(Barcelo 1993b). 
We have just seen that a concept or theoretical entity is 
more than a detected correlation among some descriptive 
features. Psychologists assume that comparison statements 
of the form a is similar to b are assessed by comparing 
features of a with features of b. Obviously not all the fea- 
tures of a and b are considered; instead, only a relevant 
subset of the features of a and b is selected before any com- 
parison or matching operation. The number of features 
that can be attributed to any given object is unlimited; any 
theory of feature matching must postulate prior feature se- 
lection. We have seen that this selection is a conceptual 
operation affected by the context in which it is produced 
and the specific goals, which underlie the matching. 
Nevertheless, traditional geometric similarity models 
are context free: they predict that the similarity between a 
and b is only a function of the distance between their de- 
scriptions and so is unaffected by how many or which other 
stimuli (different instances or different concepts) are in the 
domain. We have just seen that this assumption is wrong. 
Any two things picked at random must be similar to one 
another in at least some respects, because the particular 
ways that any two things resemble are always determined 
by the context. Also because of their questionable empiri- 
cal validity, it is desirable to investigate theories of per- 
ceived similarity not constrained by the distance axioms. 
Some authors have introduced a weighted Euclidean 
model, more akin with the new theoretical discussion of 
the nature of concepts: 
d (a, b) = [w^xj (x^ - xtp + w2yj (y, - yt)2]in 
where wi {i = x, y) is a weight reflecting the importance 
that subject ; places on dimension /. Alternatively, the 
weights may be interpreted as measures of relative selec- 
tive attention. Under this interpretation, each weight meas- 
ures the degree to which an archaeologist attends to a 
dimension (see other modifications of the same model in 
Ashby and Perrin 1988). 
One of the most influential approaches to solve the 
shortcomings in the classical model has been Tversky's 
contrast model (Tversky 1977). This model postulates prior 
extraction of those features that are relevant to the task; 
thus, the representation of an object as a collection of fea- 
tures is viewed as a product of a prior process of extraction 
and compilation. Once a relevant subset of features has 
been selected, the perceived similarity, s, between two ob- 
jects, a and b, is considered to be'a weighted function of 
selected features that are both common and distinctive: 
s(a, b) = Qf(A n B) - af(A -B)- ^f(B - A) 
where 0 reflects the weight assigned to features common 
to objects a and b, a the weight assigned to features of a 
that are not included in b, and  ß the weight assigned to 
features of b that are not included in a. Consequently, the 
similarity of an object a to an object b is conceived as a 
"linear contrast" of three, weighted feature sets: the fea- 
tures common to a and b, the features distinctive to a com- 
pared with b, and the features distinctive to b compared 
with a. 
Weighting is a way to introduce the influence of con- 
text in the similarity calculation. Weights measure the sa- 
lience of a feature, that is, their informational value. Some 
authors (see Ortony 1979, Osherson 1987, Glucksberg and 
Keysar 1990) have enhanced the model to have a more ap- 
propriate definition of this function: the salience, or weight, 
of the matching properties in a, is made to be dependent on 
the salience value of the matching properties in b. The 
resulting weighted similarity relationships have some in- 
teresting properties, among them the asymmetry in simi- 
larity relations: the recognised relationship between a and 
b differs from the recognised of b to a. Such asymmetries 
are the result to the differential salience of the features of a 
and b, which is another way to explain the context influ- 
ence on similarity. 
Modem accounts of this problem use a structure known 
as confusion matrix (Fig. 24.1). Each row in a confusion 
matrix is associated with one controlled observation, and 
each column with the concept to which this observation is 
related. The entry in row / and column j is an estimate of 
P(Rj/Si), or the typicality measure associated with each con- 
cept. In this case, we are introducing not only salience, but 
also the subjective effects derived from the relationships 
among concepts in a competitive network. 
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EXPERIMENT 
A. 
Oltserration 1 
Obseiration 2 
Obseivatlon 3 
CONCEPT 
Xsi 
CONCEPT / 
X2j 
X 3 j 
CONCEPT  m 
Xi. 
X 3m 
Figure 24.1: A 
confusion matrix. 
EXPERIMENT 
B 
OliseiTation 4 
OliserratLon 5 
Observation 6 
X4i 
Xsi 
X  6i 
Xlj 
X Si 
X 6] X5> X 8, 
EXPERIMENT 
C 
Obseiration 7 
Oliseivation 8 
ObseiTation 9 
X7i 
Xsi 
X 9i 
X7j 
Xsj 
X9] 
X7m 
XSm 
XQ. 
There are different estimations of P(R/Si) (see Ashby 
and Perrin 1988, Nosofsky 1992), although most of them 
are based on the biased-choice model: 
P{Rj I Si) = ßyriy / ZßmTlim 
Here P(R/Si) is a function of the similarity between the de- 
scription of artefact 5, and the description of artefact 5,. 
denoted 7]ij, and of the bias toward concept Rj, denoted ^. 
This expression gives the "strength" of making a Category 
j response given presentation of stimulus (an artefact de- 
scription) i; the final categorisation probability is determined 
by the ratio of this strength and the sum of strengths for all 
concepts in the network. 
When applying this model, it is assumed that similar- 
ity is symmetric, and that all self-similarities are equal. I 
have already questioned the empirical validity of these as- 
sumptions. Yet despite their possible inaccuracy, the bi- 
ased-choice model has been successful at predicting the 
results of many recognition experiments (although not any 
archaeological experiment). 
As a result of psychological studies with the choice- 
biased and related models of confusability, it has been as- 
sessed that similarity and confusability co-vary. However, 
this fact does not imply that similarity is the only factor 
affecting confusability among different possible concepts. 
Prior knowledge on each concept included in the confusion 
matrix also explains why archaeologists often go wrong 
when when deriving instances and prototyping: an archae- 
ologist with a lot of knowledge on concept RA and very few 
on concept RB will almost never confuse the most typical 
instances of the first with the most typical instances of the 
second. P(RB/SA) will be very low. 
Ashby and Perrin (1988) believe that, in the absence of 
prior knowledge bias, perceived similarity is proportional 
to the probability of a confusion. Thus, the perceived simi- 
larity between two artefacts a and b is naturally defined as 
the proportion of descriptive features associated with a fall- 
ing in the conceptual space assigned to Rb in an unbiased 
two-choice recognition task. This is a clear improvement 
of traditional geometric similarity models, which are con- 
text-free; here, similarity is measured in terms of the prob- 
ability of inter-experiment-confusion errors (Nosofsky 
1992). 
To add a new artefact or concept (or more prior knowl- 
edge) causes the archaeologist to readjust the amount of 
attention focused on each dimension, thereby stretching 
effectively some dimensions and shrinking others, and in 
so doing, changing the predicted similarities between all 
artefact pairs. Ashby and Perrin's model predicts that simi- 
larity is determined by the overlap of perceptual (descrip- 
tive) distributions; it is only under certain, very special 
conditions, that overlap and distance measures agree, and 
thus the general Euclidean scaling model is contained within 
the general recognition theory as a special case. 
We may translate psychological research (see Ashby 
and Lee 1991, Nosofsky 1992) into archaeological terms, if 
we consider each archaeological artefact as an experiment, 
and if the features selected to describe this experiment have 
some connection with the categorisation (or 
conceptualisation) process. This effect can be represented 
as a point in a multidimensional space, where noise pro- 
duced by descriptive bias is the cause of variability over 
experiments. Thus, we are assuming that a distribution of 
experiments (or controlled observations) is the appropriate 
descriptive representation of an archaeological concept (the 
weighted sum of all experiments is converted into a proto- 
type). The archaeologist is assumed to divide the experi- 
mental space (the set of concepts defined into a specific 
archaeological theory) into conceptual regions. On each 
experiment, the archaeologist determines in which region 
the descriptive effect falls and then emits the associated 
concept. To understand the relationship between identifi- 
cation, conceptualisation, and similarity we have to under- 
stand the manner in which conceptual regions change 
during prototyping. 
There is not any single way to account the effects of 
experimental context and prior knowledge into 
conceptualisation. Different statistical models have been 
designed to deal with different kinds of influence: 
• the expected value of similarity is a function of the 
difference between the means of the distribution of 
psychological magnitudes and the variance- 
covariance matrix of the difference between psycho- 
logical values (Ennis et al. 1988) 
• the probability that an instance joins a concept is 
determined jointly by the current size of each con- 
cept (the number of instances we already know), the 
similarity of the instance to the concept's central ten- 
dency (current prototype), and the value of a "cou- 
pling" parameter, which is the free parameter in the 
model. Roughly, the probability that artefact i is 
classified as an instance of Concept ; is found by 
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summing the similarity of i to each concept's cen- 
tral tendency, weighted by the category-labelj prob- 
ability associated with the concept (Anderson 1990) 
• the relative frequency with which exemplary is pre- 
sented during experimentation and the similarity 
between that instance and the others determine the 
graded category structure. In other words, archae- 
ologists make classification decisions on the basis 
of similarity and the frequency of experiments. It is 
important to realise, however, that similarity and fre- 
quency can exert mutual influence on one another, 
thereby making more intricate the relation between 
similarity, frequency, and categorisation (Nosofsky 
1988) 
• rather than group entities together on the basis of 
the similarity between two entities such as A and B, 
an archaeologist has to group entities together on 
the basis of the conceptual cohesiveness between A 
and B. The conceptual cohesiveness between two 
events depends not only on those events and sur- 
rounding events E (the set of controlled observations) 
but also on a set of concepts C that are available for 
describing A and B together, and that have been se- 
lected by the archaeologist as a representation of his/ 
her goals. Thus, the conceptual cohesiveness be- 
tween two events is a four argument function 
ßA,B,E,C) in contrast to an ordinary similarity func- 
tion of two arguments flA,B) (Stepp and Michalski 
1986). 
In this section we have studied the importance of the proper 
recognition of similarity relationships in prototyping: the 
more similar an instance is to the other members of its cat- 
egory and the less similar it is to members of contrast cat- 
egories, the higher will be the typicality rating given to 
that instance (Nosofsky 1988). Only by studying similari- 
ties and differences among different instances of a concept 
during an experimental situation, we will be able to build 
reliable prototypes and useful approximations to the defi- 
nition core of concepts. 
Similarity judgments are based on people's rep- 
resentations of entities. Therefore, rather than beginning 
with certain mathematical procedures and asking what uses 
we can find for them, it would be better to begin with the 
problems we need to solve, and then to find the most con- 
venient solution. Some archaeologists have also asserted 
the same point (cf. Read 1989): to be informative of a cul- 
tural system, a classification, that is, a structured set of con- 
cepts, must capture similitude and difference relevant to 
the meanings provided through the cultural system, and 
that is quite difficult using standard statistical techniques, 
as correlation or variance-based measures, because these 
algorithms are insensitive to the goals proposed by the ar- 
chaeologists. 
24.4.    A back-propagation algorithm to 
compute similarity relationships 
The purpose of last section has been to show some of the 
problems we have to solve in order to include context-sen- 
sitivity in similarity calculations.   Up to now there is not 
any single algorithm able to solve all these problems. We 
are obliged to use one algorithm for every different task 
instead. 
In this paper I present the back-propagation algorithm, 
first designed by Rumelhart, Hinton and Williams (1986). 
It is not the best of all prototyping algorithms, nor the an- 
swer to all theoretical problems we have studied so far, but 
it is useful in some specific tasks. An additional advantage 
is its availability as commercial and shareware software. 
Source code appears in Pao (1989). Present description of 
the algorithm is based on the vector notation by Stone 
(1986). 
A back-propagation model is a special kind of Neural 
Network. There are eight major components in any neural 
network: 
• a set of processing units 
• a state of activation 
• an output function for each unit 
• a pattern of connectivity among units 
• a propagation rule for propagating patterns of ac- 
tivities through the network of connectivities 
• an activation rule for combining the inputs imping- 
ing on a unit with the current state of that unit to 
produce a new level of activation for the unit 
• a learning rule whereby patterns of connectivity are 
modified by experience 
• an environment within which the system must oper- 
ate 
Figure 24.2 shows a way to represent neural networks in 
terms of a confusion matrix. There is a set of processing 
units (inputs and outputs) indicated by circles in the dia- 
gram. Each unit has an activation value, which is passed 
through a function to produce an output value. This output 
value is transmitted to other units in the system, through a 
set of unidirectional connections. There is associated with 
each connection a real number, usually called weight or 
strength of the connection, which determines the amount 
of effect that the first unit has on the second. The pattern 
of interconnections is not fixed, rather the weights can un- 
dergo modification while processing is underway as a func- 
tion of experience. 
Any neural network (or parallel activation model) be- 
gins with a set of processing units. These units represent 
particular conceptual entities such as artefacts, descriptive 
features or concepts. We can distinguish the input units — 
representing descriptive features — from output units — 
representing concepts or theoretical entities; we also need 
a third layer of hidden units to store the connection weights 
among input and output units. 
In addition to the set of units we need a representation 
of the state of the network at time t. This is specified by a 
vector of/V real numbers representing the pattern of activa- 
tion over the set of processing units. In most cases we know 
the activation state of the input units. For instance, below 
shows variables which describe the way we see some arte- 
facts. 
Length Height     Width 
Artefact-1 12.5 4.2 3.1 
Artefact-2 10.2 5.3 2.2 
Artefact-3 9.5 8.3 4.0 
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Figure 24.2: A matrix representation for neural networks. 
Here we are working with a three input unit model (one for 
each variable), and we know three successive states of acti- 
vation (one for each observation or artefact). The same can 
be seen for the output units (remember that we are in a 
supervised learning model). If our three observations have 
been rigorously controlled, we know that: 
Chronology 
Artefact-1 11th Century 
Artefact-2 10th Century 
Artefact-3 9th Century 
This network has only one output unit, and we know 
three successive states of activation for it. Units interact by 
transmitting signals to their neighbours, and therefore the 
degree to which they affect their neighbours, is determined 
by their degree of activation. Associated with each unit, ui 
there is an output function f(oi) which maps the current 
state of activation (<a, (t)) to an output signal. In the back- 
propagation algorithm here explained, we assume the fol- 
lowing sigmoid logistic non-linearity: 
oi = 1/(1 +e-(•='J *«'>*") 
The parameter6, serves as a threshold or bias {learning rate). 
Each unit provides an additive contribution to the input of 
the units to which it is connected. In such cases, the total 
input of the unit is simply the weighted sum of the separate 
inputs from each of the individual units. That is, the in- 
puts from all the incoming units are simply multiplied by a 
weight, and summed to get the input to that unit. 
net; = IwijOi 
Given the fact that each unit is connected to all other units 
in the network, a positive weight represents an excitatory 
input and a negative weight represents an inhibitory input. 
We use here a weight matrix W to represent such a pattern 
of connectivity. The weight w.. is a positive number if unit 
u excites unit M., it is a negative number if unit u. inhibits 
unit u ; and it is 0 if there is no direct connection among the 
units. Units in each layer (input, hidden and output layers) 
are not connected among them. 
Let us see how a back-propagation model operates: 
Step 1. 
Initialise weights and offsets (or learning rates). Set all 
weights and node offsets to small random values 
sup 2. 
Present input and desired outputs. Present a continuous 
valued input vector {xo,Xi,... x„.i ) representing one single 
observation (for example the description of an archaeologi- 
cal artefact), and specify the desired output (do,di,... d„,.i). 
Step 3. 
Calculate actual outputs. Use the sigmoid non-linearity 
output function fid ) and the following formulae to calcu- 
late outputs (yo.yi ,••• ym-i ): 
y„,=f{^'^hnX.k-   Oj) 
Xt=f{'LwjtXo-  Oç,) 
Note that y„ is the set of units in the output layer. Their 
respective values have to be calculated from the values in 
the previous {intermediate or hidden layer) one. 
Step 4. 
Adapt weights. Use a recursive algorithm starting at the 
output nodes and working back to the hidden layer. Adjust 
weights by: 
Wij (t+\) = Wij (t) + TjSjXi 
In this equation wij (f) is the weight from hidden unit i from 
an input to unity at time t. Xiis either the output of unit i or 
is an input, 7 is a scalar constant, which determines the 
rate of learning, and ^ is an error term for unity (it can be 
seen as the difference between the desired and actual out- 
put on input i). If unity is in the output layer, then: 
ôj = yj(l-yj)(dj-yj) 
where dj is the desired output of unit j and yj is the actual 
output produced in Step 3. If unit j is an internal hidden 
layer, then 
^ = Xj(l-Xj)'LôtWjic 
where k is over all units in the layers above unity. Internal 
unit thresholds are adapted in a similar manner by assum- 
ing they are connection weights on links fi-om auxiliary 
constant-valued inputs. Convergence is sometimes faster 
if a momentum term is added and weight changes are 
smoothed by: 
Wij(t+l) = Wij (t) + TjSjXi + a (Wij (t) - Wij (t - I)) 
where 0< a< 1. 
Step 5. 
Repeat by going to step 2. Take another vector input repre- 
senting the next empirical observation, and start the itera- 
tive processing again. 
This algorithm is typically applied to the case in which 
pairs of patterns, consisting of an input pattern and a target 
output pattern, are to be associated so that when an input 
pattern is presented to an input layer of units, the appropri- 
ate output pattern will appear on the output layer of units. 
The procedure is an iterative gradient algorithm designed 
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to minimise the mean square error between the calculated 
output and the observed one in an experimental situation. 
To sum up, back-propagation is a supervised learning 
technique that compares the responses of the output units 
to the desired response, and readjust the weights in the net- 
work so that the next time that the same input is presented 
to the network, the network's response will be closer to the 
desired response. The learning procedure consists of the 
net starting off with a random set of weight values, choos- 
ing one of the observations or data items, and using that 
pattern as input, evaluating the outputs in a feed-forward 
manner. The errors at the output generally will be quite 
large, which demands changes in the weights. Using the 
back-propagation procedure, the net calculates ApWji for all 
the Wji in the network for that particular p. This procedure 
is repeated for all the patterns in the training set to yield 
the resulting Awy, for all the weights for that one presenta- 
tion. The corrections to the weights are made, and the out- 
put is again evaluated in feed-forward manner. 
Discrepancies between actual and target output values again 
result in evaluation of weight changes. After complete pres- 
entation of all patterns in the training set, a new set of 
weights is obtained and new outputs are again evaluated in 
a feed-forward manner. In a successful learning exercise, 
the system error will decrease with the number of itera- 
tions, and the procedure will converge to a stable set of 
weights, which will exhibit only small fluctuations in value 
as further learning is attempted. 
24.5.    An example using Iberian Bronze 
Age data 
I have chosen an example from Iberian Late Bronze Age to 
show how a back-propagation network operates. The se- 
ries of warrior decorated stelae can be dated between 1100 
BC and 7th century BC. (Barcelo 1989, Powell 1976). In 
this case I will be concerned with the analysis of Phoenician 
colonisation effects on indigenous populations, as shown 
by the items engraved in the stelae. 
The network has a 3 x 4 matrix-configured output (Fig. 
24.3), that is, three experimental variables (degree of colo- 
nisation, region and chronology), each one with 4 values: 
• four chronological phases (standard chronology : Late 
Bronze Age II, Late Bronze Age III, Orientalising 
[Tartessos], Post-Colonisation [Palaeo-Iberian]), 
• four geographical regions: Tajo valley, Guadiana 
Valley, Zujar valley, and Guadalquivir valley 
• degree of colonisation, as deduced from the quantity 
of imported items in the Stelae: >3, >5, >7, >9. 
The objective is to build a working definition of the con- 
cept COLONISATION, using as raw information the similarity 
among all stelae in the same region, and with the same 
chronology. In other words, I want to know if all stelae are 
similar according to an explanatory concept, and not if they 
are similar in iconographie terms. 
This is a typical supervised-leaming model. For each 
stelae we know its chronology, geographical situation and 
the number of engraved imported items. Input units use a 
5x5 matrix to represent empirical information: 
• total number of iconographie motives in a stela 
iconographie importance of human figure 
• iconographie importance of shield 
number of "prestige" items in a stela 
• degree of schematism 
I have trained the network (in back-propagation mode) us- 
ing 38 examples. In more archaeological terms, the algo- 
rithm has to calculate the relationship between iconography, 
geography, chronology and colonisation using those exam- 
ples. The specific question I want to answer is: 
"Are the iconographically most complex stelae situ- 
ated in the regions and chronological phases where 
Phoenician colonisation was stronger?" 
After three hours of Computer Time (Fig. 24.4), the back- 
propagation engine was not able to converge to a satisfac- 
tory (in mathematical terms) solution.   The best average 
error obtained was 0.1176, and the algorithm arrived only 
at a 96% of right answers. 
How can we use these results? First of all, it is impor- 
tant to realise that a neural network is not an easy formula 
that we can use everywhere. The weight matrix can only 
be used by the computer. In other words, the representa- 
tion of the concept COLONISATION exists only in the compu- 
ter. To understand it we have not to read computer 
print-outs, but to begin a series of experiments with the 
computer solution. For instance; we may begin by compar- 
ing the input with the calculated output. Although I have 
stopped processing before the algorithm arrives at the tol- 
erance level, the fit between known and calculated output 
is excellent. Specially good has been the correction in chro- 
nology vectors (Fig. 24.5). Known values were most of the 
time rather ambiguous; for example, Ecija I was dated in 
the Orientalising period with a 0.5 probability of error, and 
the probability for a post-orientalising date was also 0.5 
(there were not any good chronological items). The pro- 
gram has re-evaluated these probabilities into 0.70 for the 
orientalising period and 0.30 for the post-orientalising one. 
The program has used the similarity between this stelae 
and others to modify the first evaluation. The same can be 
said for El Cameril (0.62 LBA II, 0.39 LBA III). It is also 
interesting the case of the Monte Blanco 5fóZa, a very doubt- 
ful exemplar, whose chronology has been established by 
the computer in the orientalising period, but with low prob- 
ability rates (0.49). 
After this examination we have to conclude that the 
network has been well trained, and that the concept (COLO- 
NISATION) has been well induced. Now we can use the con- 
cept to explain new data. I have selected a new series of 12 
stelae (different than those in the input) as candidate in- 
stances for the concept. Validation shows many surprises. 
The program has produced some important mistakes try- 
ing to predict the region, number of imported items and 
chronology in the new set of data. Usually it confounds 
contiguous regions, although most of the stelae from the 
Tagus region have been correctly assigned. Chronological 
predictions are interesting, because the program has been 
able to learn only some phases (LBA II and Post- 
Orientalising), the other ones are not wrongly predicted, 
but receive a lesser probability (i.e. some items have not 
any sure chronology, because neither phase obtains a suffi- 
cient activation). 
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Figure 24.3: Input and output vectors for some stelae. 
All these negative results coincide with what we ex- 
pected from archaeological research in the area. Chronol- 
ogy can be partially explained using similarities, however 
the concept COLONISATION cannot be represented exclusively 
in terms of similarity relationships among stelae, because 
not all stelae in the same region, with the same chronol- 
ogy, and with the same number of imported items are simi- 
lar in iconographie structure. In the same phase and in the 
same region, colonisation has different effects on the ico- 
nography of stelae. 
24.6.    Using neural network models to 
reproduce archaeological 
reasoning 
A neural network or connectionist representation can be 
characterised by three general computational features: dis- 
tinct layers of interconnected units, recursive rules for up- 
dating the strengths of the connections during learning, and 
"simple" homogeneous computing elements (Hanson and 
Burr 1990). Using just these three features one can con- 
struct surprisingly elegant and powerful models of 
conceptualisation, and even archaeological theories. What 
interest us here is the correspondence or mapping between 
numerical activity vectors and the units in the network or 
elements of the problem domain addressed by the model. 
Those elements that are subject to representation mappings 
can be broadly divided into two types: observable elements 
(input), and theoretical entities that are hypothesized but 
not directly observable (output) (Smolensky 1990). 
The learning procedure is based on the strengthening 
of the connections among those units that co-occur and 
weakening the connections between pairs of units in which 
one is on and the other is off, and the result, a vector of 
activations (or matrix in the usual multidimensional case) 
is a prototype. Therefore, prototypes are represented in 
terms of a response function: the fact that a given unit is 
active in the output layer gives only a rough indication of 
the value being represented, but knowing which collection 
of units is active can give a quite accurate indication of the 
value being represented. This representation model repro- 
duces exactly what we have analysed before. Back-propa- 
gation algorithm is supposed to reproduce the inductive 
mechanism, while the structure of the network (the number 
of units, the number of layers, the output function, the acti- 
vation rule, etc.) is supposed to simulate meta-knowledge. 
There is not any difficulty in understanding what has 
been represented in the input and output layers. But what 
is about the hidden layer? I have said that this layer stores 
the weights and interconnections between input and out- 
put; therefore, it represents the mapping between observa- 
tion and theory. Consequently, if output and input units 
represent the definition core of any concept, then this par- 
ticular mapping or correspondence represents prototyping 
relationships. That is, the degree to which we know that 
an item is an instance of that concept. 
What is unique to the framework here described is the 
formal medium that supports representations: numerical 
(activity) vectors. A particular activity pattern of the net- 
work can only be defined in terms of the problem domain 
(input and outputs). Remember that the activation of any 
hidden layer is indicated by the activity of a set of units 
whose activity determines the representation of other ele- 
ments in the problem domain. 
Nevertheless, the prototype we can obtain using this 
method is not represented in linguistic terms. There is not 
any single list of variables and attributes. Instead we have 
a matrix of weights and coefficients, and it is not easy to 
see how we can use it for archaeological purposes. What 
we have obtained are "approximations" to the target units; 
that is, approximations to what we knew before starting the 
conceptualisation. As target values are the result of some 
controlled observation or experiment, and we have consid- 
ered them as a qualitative measure of conceptualisation (1 
= this input case is an instance of the given concept, 0 = 
this input case is not an instance of the given concept), we 
may use the network outputs as & quantification of the rela- 
tionship. In other words, the network outputs are typical- 
ity measures. Nevertheless, we do not know the 
mathematical properties of these measures, nor their asso- 
ciated probability distribution. Shepard (1987) has pointed 
out that with highly similar stimuli (empirical data) or with 
delayed test stimuli, the relationship between similarity and 
distance was of Gaussian form and that the distance metric 
appeared to be Euclidean. This fact has not yet been ana- 
lysed in neural network (although some initial work in this 
direction has been published by Staddon and Reid 1990). 
There are some other drawbacks, too, but they are not 
relevant for the subject of this paper. The heart of my pro- 
posal has been to show that archaeological conceptualisation 
does not depend on the perceived similarities among in- 
stances, but on the results of controlled observation. Con- 
sequently we are computing a similarity relationship based 
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Figure 24.4: State of the network at successive training cycles. 
on the identity between typicality measures: two artefacts 
are similar if and only if they are instances of the same 
concept. Note that similarity is not a consequence of "for- 
mal resemblance in general details", but of "the simultane- 
ous activation of input units representing empirical data". 
Therefore, similarity is a consequence of typicality (the de- 
gree to which input units are instances of the same con- 
cept). Typicality is the result of the adjusting the strength 
of the connection between input units in proportion to the 
product of their simultaneous activation {Hebbian rule). 
Obviously, similar patterns of activation produce similar 
effects; therefore, the similarity based on "formal resem- 
blance" appears as a special case of the model. 
24.7.     Conclusions 
In this paper it has been show how archaeological concepts 
may be represented as particular patterns of activation as- 
sociated with some specific inputs. In so doing, the repre- 
sentation of the concept is set up in such a way that the 
knowledge necessary influences the course of processing, 
and has not any meaning outside the system in which they 
have been produced. Consequently, it would be a serious 
mistake to pretend a decoding of the activity vector in terms 
of some external linguistic reality. 
Archaeological concepts are theoretical entities, and 
not natural categories. Therefore, we have to study them 
by analysing how archaeologists use them, and not as in- 
trinsic properties in the archaeological record. The main 
consequences we can deduce from the archaeological use 
of a concept are the following: 
• a single concept has different instances, and there is 
no similarity between them. 
• relationships among instances do not depend on nec- 
essary properties, but on the previous knowledge or 
experience we have about that concept. Differences 
among the instances of a concept are due to unnec- 
essary (and non intrinsic) properties, 
instead of offering defining conditions, concepts are 
intrinsically^zzj. Their definition core depends on 
the way we use the concepts. 
Neural network systems and back-propagation algorithms 
allow archaeologists to follow these definition assumptions. 
Any stable pattern of activity is a concept, but a stable pat- 
tern of activity is only that whose units satisfy some of the 
micro-inferences and violate others. That is to say, a stable 
pattern of activity is one that violates the plausible micro- 
inferences less than any of the neighbouring patterns. We 
may modify the concept representation schema by chang- 
ing the inference rules so that the new pattern violates them 
less than its neighbours. We have to consider archaeologi- 
cal conceptualisation as a process that constructs a pattern 
of activity, which represents the most plausible item that is 
consistent with the given knowledge.   Note that we are 
speaking about the most plausible, and not about a struc- 
turally correct one. Neural networks provide us with good 
but not optimal fit. 
Some authors (see. Partridge 1990, among others) have 
stressed the inappropriateness of neural networks to simu- 
late scientific reasoning. The main drawback of this model 
is its black box character, preventing a description of the 
system in linguistic terms. I suppose that most archaeolo- 
gists may see it as a fundamental drawback, on the oppo- 
site I think that this "non-linguistic" character of 
representation is one of the main advantages of the model 
(see also Gardin 1990).  Because of the supervised-leam- 
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ing philosophy, concepts represented in a neural network 
have a meaning according to examples used in its construc- 
tion. Probably it cannot be easily expressed in linguistic 
terms, but they are useful using a powerful computer. Nowa- 
days, it is common to say that the theoretical literature on 
similarity and classification has diverged from archaeologi- 
cal practice to such a degree that the two are now unre- 
lated. In this paper I have tried to solve this disparity. It 
may seem contradictory that a black box can be a practical 
system. The question is how to use a neural network, and 
not why to select complex procedures to solve simple prob- 
lems. Archaeological problems are not simple, although 
some archaeologists seem to think so. 
The future evolution of statistical research in ar- 
chaeology seems to be in this new domain. The goal of this 
paper is only to show some new methods, which can be 
used to integrate theory building and statistical discovery. 
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